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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE SMELL OF HERRING: A CRITIQUE OF
THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST
ASSAULT ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
WAYNE R. LAFAVE*
"The herring, the smell of herring again .... The smell of the
herring had penetrated [one's] thoughts .... "
MARTHA BLUM, THE WALNUT TREE 227 (1999).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, about the time I began my labors in academe, the Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio1 gave full effect to the Fourth Amendment by
extending the suppression remedy of Weeks v. United States2 to cases in the
state courts as well. It was thus perhaps inevitable that the Fourth
Amendment (in actuality "second to none in the Bill of Rights"3 ) should
become my cheval de bataille. In the intervening years-almost a half
century now-my main preoccupation (or, some would doubtless say, my
obsession) has been with that Amendment, and thus, I have had occasion
during that time to study and reflect upon what must be hundreds of
Supreme Court decisions having to do with search and seizure.4 Many of
those decisions were, in my judgment, right on the mark, while others
seemed to me only slightly off target. There is a third group of cases that,
suffice it to say, I could not bring myself to describe so generously, and
. David C. Baum Professor of Law Emeritus and Professor in the Center for Advanced
Study Emeritus, University of Illinois.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4 The main evidence of those efforts is to be found in a multi-volume treatise on the
subject, now in its six-volume fourth edition. 1-6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
(4th ed. 2004).
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then, of course, yet another group that I would characterize as flat-out
wrong.
And then came a case styled Herring v. United States,5 a 5-4 decision
handed down just this past January, which, I am chagrined to say, appears
to deserve a category of its own, and not on the positive side of the scale.
Herring, holding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable
whenever "the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from
the arrest,"'6 is not simply wrong; it is wrong over and over again! The
opinion of the Chief Justice for the majority (1) falsely claims that cost-
benefit balancing is an established basis for selectively applying the
exclusionary rule at a criminal trial because of a police violation of the
Fourth Amendment; (2) falsely represents that the Court's precedents
support the proposition that the exclusionary rule may be selectively
applied depending upon the degree of "culpability" attending the Fourth
Amendment violation; (3) asserts as a foregone conclusion, without an iota
of supporting analysis or evidence, the proposition that application of the
exclusionary rule in the instance of a negligent violation of the Fourth
Amendment has a reduced "deterrent effect"; (4) purports to cabin the
holding by the apparent afterthought that the negligence must also be
"attenuated," but without any explanation of what attenuation means in the
instant or any other case, or why attenuation is relevant to the critical
conclusion of reduced "deterrent effect"; and (5) inflicts upon trial and
appellate courts new and uniquely difficult tasks to be performed in
adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims. It is thus apparent that this
Herring is no mere herring; it is surstr~mming, which (as any Swede can
tell you) is touted as a "delicacy" but is actually attended by both a
loathsome smell that "grows progressively stronger" and a dangerous
capacity to "explode" beyond its existing boundaries.
7
In Herring, an investigator, apparently suspicious because the
defendant "was no stranger to law enforcement" and was seeking "to
retrieve something from his impounded truck," requested that a warrant
check be run on him and was advised that the computer database in the
sheriffs department of a neighboring county showed "an active arrest
' 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
6 Id. at 698.
7 Bob Brooke, One of the World's Strangest Dishes, ALL SCANDINAVIA,
http://www.allscandinavia.com/surstromming.htm (last visited May 1, 2009). This site
should be consulted about this sour Baltic herring, still to be found in Sweden, by any non-
Swedes who believe I am making this up. For those who, unlike me, are favorably disposed
toward the Herring decision, you may wish to take advantage of
http://www.buy-surstromming.com, where surstr6mming can be ordered on-line.
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warrant for [his] failure to appear on a felony charge." 8 On the basis of that
information, the investigator arrested the defendant and, in a search incident
to the arrest, found drugs and a pistol on his person, ultimately leading to
federal prosecution. It was subsequently determined that the computer
record was in error and that, actually, the warrant had been recalled five
months earlier. The court of appeals assumed that whoever failed to update
the sheriffs records "was also a law enforcement official," 9 but nonetheless
affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
because "the conduct in question [wa]s a negligent failure to act, not a
deliberate or tactical choice to act."' 0  The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, while "accept[ing] the parties' assumption that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation"'" in arresting the defendant on a nonexistent
warrant, concluded that the exclusionary rule was not applicable in a case
such as this, namely, where "the error was the result of isolated negligence
attenuated from the arrest., 12 The Herring majority reached this conclusion
by application of the seemingly broader proposition that "[t]o trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." 13
The holding in Herring finds little support in the Chief Justice's
opinion for the majority, which perhaps accurately reflects his apparent
longstanding opposition to the exclusionary rule, 14 but is totally
unconvincing and in many respects irrelevant and disingenuous. The
Herring majority gets off to a bad start by hanging its collective hat on
Justice Scalia's bald assertion in Hudson v. Michigan that suppression "has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse,"' 5 a declaration which, as
two thoughtful scholars have recently documented, "defies historical
truth.' 6  Next, the Herring majority describes the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule solely in terms of its deterrence function, rather than as
encompassing the other two purposes recognized in earlier decisions of the
8 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
9 Id. at 699.
10 Id. (quoting United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (1 1th Cir. 2007)).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 698.
13 Id. at 702.
14 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Edging Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at Al (noting that back in 1983, as a lawyer in the Reagan White
House, Roberts "was hard at work on what he called in a memorandum 'the campaign to
amend or abolish the exclusionary rule').
"S 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
16 Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some
Thoughts on "Suppression as a Last Resort," 41 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2008).
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Supreme Court,1 7 which at least can be said to be unremarkable 8 in light of
the Court's tendency for some years now to view the suppression sanction
with an equally narrow focus.
II. COST-BENEFIT BALANCING
Following this comes the announcement of the general principle,
without any stated restriction or limitation, that "the benefits of deterrence
must outweigh the costs." 19 Put in such bold terms, it is made to appear that
this cost-benefit balancing process is a routine part of the assessment as to
when the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be applied, but
nothing could be further from the truth. This is manifested in the cases that
the Herring Court primarily relies upon in its further discussion of this
balancing concept: United States v. Leon,20 Illinois v. Krull,21 Arizona v.
Evans,22 United States v. Calandra,2 3 Stone v. Powell,24 and Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott.25 The latter three decisions, as well
as several other Supreme Court cases of like kind,26 all represent instances
in which the Court had concluded that application of the exclusionary rule
at the criminal trial itself suffices to provide the necessary deterrence, so
17 One of these purposes is "the imperative of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), also recognized in Mapp and later cases; the other is "assuring the
people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government would
not profit from its lawless behavior," United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), recognized as early as Weeks and implicit in the analysis in Mapp.
18 At least as compared to the embrace of those other functions by all four dissenters. As
noted by one scholar:
The four dissenters say something equally interesting for the future direction of the exclusionary
rule, given some possibility that the new administration might replace one of the Justices in the
Herring majority. For some time, the Court has appeared to agree that there is no rationale for
the exclusionary rule other than the deterrence of future Fourth Amendment violations. But the
four dissenters appear to revive the other rationale for the rule, stated in Mapp but fallen from
favor: that exclusion preserves the integrity of the judiciary by avoiding complicity in the
constitutional violation. One more vote for this proposition would not only reverse Herring, but
might actually re-invigorate the exclusionary rule to a degree not seen since before the Rehnquist
Court.
Richard McAdams, Herring and the Exclusionary Rule, UNIV. OF CHI. FACULTY BLOG,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/0 /herring-and-the-exclusionary-rule.html
(Jan. 17, 2009, 00:06 CST).
19 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
25 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
21 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
22 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
23 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
24 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
25 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
26 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.6.
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that additional suppression at certain other proceedings (for example, before
the grand jury, on habeas corpus, and at a parole revocation hearing, as in
Calandra, Stone, and Scott, respectively), in the interest of still more
deterrence, is not worth the candle. Thus, those cases are clearly
distinguishable from the action taken in Herring.
The same is true of the first three cases in the above listing. The two
"good faith" cases, Leon and Krull, represent instances where cost-benefit
balancing was deemed appropriate because of another kind of special
circumstance: the person primarily responsible for the Fourth Amendment
violation was not a law enforcement official but rather a judge (in Leon)
and legislators (in Krull), a very significant fact deemed to change the
dynamics of the deterrence analysis. The same is true of Evans, which
deserves special attention here because the nature of the Fourth Amendment
violation was identical to that in Herring except for the fact that the
offending clerk was in the employ of the judiciary. As acknowledged by
the Herring majority, Evans decided that exclusion in the interest of
deterrence was not called for in such circumstances "for three reasons"27: (i)
the exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial
misconduct; (ii) court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth
Amendment; and (iii) there was no reason to believe that application of the
exclusionary rule in such a case would have a significant effect in deterring
errors by court employees.
Obviously, none of these reasons is present in Herring, where the
misconduct was by a law enforcement official. Yet the Court would have
us believe that Herring matches up with these decisions, especially Leon,
by offering the non sequitur that if under Leon it is not necessary to
suppress "evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant," then the "same is true when
evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
recalled warrant. 28 Not so, as these are apples and oranges.
Thus, on the preliminary question of whether Herring is the kind of
case in which some sort of cost-benefit balancing process might be
appropriately pursued, the many precedents cited by the Court do not
support any such undertaking. Rather, of the Court's prior decisions, the
precedent for pursuing such an inquiry even as to exclusion at a criminal
trial for a Fourth Amendment violation by police is reduced to a list of one:
Hudson v. Michigan,29 where the Court's cost-benefit balancing was not
even essential to the decision given the Court's added reliance upon the
27 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009).
28 Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
29 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine. But even if we pass by all of this and
simply concentrate upon how the balancing act was performed in Herring,
the Court's decision still does not pass muster.
On the cost side of the equation, the Herring majority makes no claim
that the cost of exclusion in this particular case would be especially high,
and rightly so, as any claim otherwise would invoke the discredited
"comparative reprehensibility '30 approach to the exclusionary rule. The
"principal cost of applying the rule" in this case, just as in all others where
exclusion occurs, says the Court, is "letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free. 31  But this matter of cost ought to be kept in
perspective. The essential point is that the cost is not imposed by the
exclusionary rule, but by the Fourth Amendment itself.32  If the
exclusionary rule had been applied to Mr. Herring's benefit, he would then
not have been convicted in the federal court for illegally possessing the gun
and drugs found on his person. But by like token, if the law enforcement
officials had not violated the Fourth Amendment in such a way as to cause
Mr. Herring's arrest on a nonexistent warrant, then once again he would
have escaped conviction for those crimes on that occasion.
Whatever weight is assigned to the cost factor must be outdone by the
potential for deterrence in that particular situation, for, as Herring instructs,
"the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs." 33  (Defendants,
apparently, lose all ties.) Assaying the magnitude of those benefits has
proved to be a daunting task in the kinds of cases the Court has most often
dealt with in the past, where it is at least possible to think about the need for
or the possibility of deterrence via exclusion regarding various kinds of
non-police actors or with respect to settings other than the criminal trial
itself. But how does one go about this task when, as Herring contemplates,
the question is whether the exclusionary rule is to be applied at a trial in
light of a Fourth Amendment violation by a law enforcement official? The
answer of the Herring majority is that the deterrence benefit derived from
30 See Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987) (criticizing various proposals for limiting the
exclusionary rule to instances in which the police violation is more reprehensible than the
defendant's crime).
3 1 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701.
32 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1392-93 (1983). "Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected," as
the "critics fail to acknowledge that, in many instances, the same extremely relevant
evidence would not have been obtained had the police officer complied with the commands
of the [F]ourth [A]mendment in the first place." Id.
33 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.
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exclusion "varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.,
34
Hence one important-probably the most important--characteristic of the
class of Fourth Amendment violations now declared to be outside the reach
of the exclusionary rule is said to be that the error constitutes only "isolated
negligence," as distinguished from "deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence.
35
Il1. THE "CULPABILITY" DISTINCTION
But where does the Herring Court find this "culpability" test for
determining the scope of the exclusionary rule? It is set out as if a foregone
conclusion, and is immediately followed with quotations from Leon and
Krull, suggesting that the notion is well-grounded in existing jurisprudence
on the exclusionary rule. The quote from Leon, which seems rather
compelling, is that "an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct
constitutes an important step in the calculus" of applying the exclusionary
rule.3 6 But that brief excerpt has been taken completely out of context by
the Herring majority, as the "calculus" the Court was talking about at that
point in Leon regards the "dissipation of the taint" aspect of the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, the notion that the connection between the Fourth
Amendment violation and the evidence sought to be suppressed can
sometimes be so tenuous that the exclusionary rule need not be applied to
that evidence. The Leon case cites Dunaway v. New York37 in support of
the proposition quoted in Herring, and then, significantly, offers this quote
from Dunaway: "When there is a close causal connection between the
illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence
more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the
evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts., 38 This
makes it even more apparent that the quote extracted from Leon has
absolutely nothing to do with the issue in Herring. In Herring, the
connection between the negligent omission causing the records of the
sheriffs office to render a false report on the date defendant was arrested
and the arrest itself is indeed "close," and thus there is no occasion in a
Herring kind of case to engage in the sort of "assessment of the flagrancy"
the Court talked about in Leon.
14 Id. at 701.
" Id. at 702.
36 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984).
17 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
31 Id. at 218.
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As for the other quote put forward by the Herring majority, from
Krull, it says that "evidence should be suppressed 'only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment."'' 39 But here, again, the context of the quotation indicates that
its meaning is other than as represented in Herring. Krull presented the
question of whether the exclusionary rule should apply when an officer
acted pursuant to authority set forth in a statute that itself is subsequently
found to violate the Fourth Amendment. The discussion at the point in the
case where the above quotation appears is directed toward making the point
that such a situation should be dealt with in essentially the same fashion as
in Leon. Both cases involved situations having two common ingredients:
(i) the officer in each instance had acted in reliance upon an authoritative
non-police source (a judge who issued the warrant at issue in Leon, the
legislators who enacted the statute at issue in Krul); and (ii) exclusion
merely to deter the non-police source was deemed unnecessary. By using
the above-quoted language, the Krull Court was making the point that
because in both instances we would ordinarily expect the police officer to
act according to the directive received from the judge and legislature,
respectively, it also makes no sense to exclude the evidence in the interest
of police deterrence where he neither knew nor should have known that the
directive received from an authoritative non-police source would later turn
out not to square with the protections of the Fourth Amendment. That
notion has no counterpart in a case like Herring, where the
arresting/searching officer was prompted to act as he did by an error of
Fourth Amendment magnitude made within the law enforcement system
itself.
Since neither Leon nor Krull supports the Herring majority's
magnitude-of-culpability approach, it is not surprising that the Court went
on to seek other underpinnings for it. One was an assertion by Judge
Friendly in an article nearly forty-five years ago that "[t]he beneficent aim
of the exclusionary rule to deter police conduct can be sufficiently
accomplished by a practice.., outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or
deliberate violation of rights., 40 The Friendly piece seems an odd choice, at
best, if one is seeking to determine the proper limits of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. As the Herring dissenters point out,41 the
Friendly article argues that the rule should not apply just because the police
39 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
40 Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L.
Rav. 929, 953 (1965) (citations omitted).
41 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 706 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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have "blundered," thus aligning Friendly with the oft-quoted position of
Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, who "distilled in a single ... sentence ' 42 the
case against the exclusionary rule: "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered., 43 But this "misleading epigram' 44 has never been
an ingredient in the pre-Herring exclusionary rule; it was quoted but then
rejected by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases on more than
one occasion.45
The Herring majority attempts to rehabilitate Friendly because of his
prescience, characterizing his above-quoted words as "[a]nticipating the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. ' ' 6 Not so! As discussed
above, the main thrust of cases such as Leon and Krull is that the Fourth
Amendment violation was brought about by an authoritative agency or
individual outside law enforcement who is neither in need of deterrence nor
likely to be deterred by suppression of the fruits of that violation. There is
in these cases, to be sure, recognition that there must also be some inquiry
to ensure that the police should not have appreciated the subsequently
declared defect in the directive they received from the judiciary or
legislature, thus assuring that there is no police deterrence function to be
served. But that is a far cry from an across-the-board limitation of the
exclusionary rule to instances of "flagrant or deliberate" violations of the
Fourth Amendment. And in any event, Leon and Krull do not represent
instances in which-even in the special circumstances obtaining in those
cases-police conduct that is merely "negligent" is an occasion for non-
suppression. As the Court explained in Krull, regarding the rule applicable
in both of those cases, for the police to be acting "in objective good faith,"
so that the fruits of the Fourth Amendment violation need not be
suppressed, it is essential to show that the officer acted "in objective
reasonable reliance" upon the judge's warrant or the legislature's statute.47
The Herring majority also contends that the Friendly position is on
target because the conduct he would remove from the exclusionary
sanction, and, indeed, the conduct that Herring does remove from that
sanction, is "far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the
42 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960).
43 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
44 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. On the
other hand, Cardozo's language was most frequently embraced in the concurring and
dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 746
(1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416 n.1 (1977); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971).
46 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
47 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987).
2009]
WAYNE R. LAFA VE
rule in the first place."48 The reference, of course, is to Weeks v. United
States49 and Mapp v. Ohio,5° where, it is emphasized in Herring, "flagrant
conduct"5' was involved-search of a home without a warrant and without
probable cause in Weeks, and search of a home on a false warrant in Mapp.
But since in neither of these cases was the Supreme Court's adoption of an
exclusionary rule, in the federal system and in the states, respectively, a we-
hold-on-these-facts type of ruling, the claim that it was the flagrancy of the
acts in Weeks and Mapp that led to adoption of the exclusionary rule is, at
best, pure speculation. The opinion in Weeks described the flagrant conduct
in some detail, but there is no suggestion of a degree-of-culpability
limitation in the Court's ruling, which instead declares the absolute that
"unlawful seizures.., should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts. 52 Mapp is, if anything, even more certain on this point, as while
again the flagrant acts are described in the case, the Court's ultimate
holding could not be clearer: "[A]I1 evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court., 5 3
The Herring majority's next line of attack, which has a bit more
substance to it, is an argument by analogy to the Court's decision in Franks
v. Delaware.54 At issue in Franks was whether a defendant in a criminal
case ever has a right, subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search
warrant, to challenge the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued,
notwithstanding its facial sufficiency. The Court answered that question in
the affirmative, but somewhat limited the circumstances in which a hearing
upon such a challenge must be held: the allegedly false statements had to be
critical to the prior probable-cause finding, and there had to be "allegations
of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth," as
"[a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient., 55 Hence
the Herring majority concluded:
Both this case and Franks concern false information provided by police. Under
Franks, negligent police miscommunications in the course of acquiring a warrant do
not provide a basis to rescind a warrant and render a search or arrest invalid. Here,
the miscommunications occurred in a different context-after the warrant had been
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
49 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
50 367 U.S. 643.
51 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
52 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
13 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654.
54 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
15 Id. at 171.
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issued and recalled-but that fact should not require excluding the evidence
obtained.
56
But just as there can be "false information," there can also be false
analogies. Thus, before this reasoning is accepted on the useful-analogy
point it would seem that two questions deserve to be answered: (1) What is
the reason underlying the Court's drawing of the negligent versus
intentional/reckless distinction in Franks? and (2) Does that reason carry
over to the different issue presented in Herring?
Unfortunately, the answer to the first of these questions is not to be
found in Franks, for, notwithstanding the pre-Franks existence in some
jurisdictions of an affidavit-impeaching process that extended even to
negligent misrepresentations, 57 Franks says nothing as to precisely why the
line was drawn as it was, except for the general observation that this
balance was struck in light of the competing interests involved. But in
asserting that "a flat ban on impeachment of veracity" 58 was unjustified, it
appears that the Franks Court wished to open the door, but not too far, thus
leaving what is now referred to as a Franks hearing as somewhat of a
disfavored procedure. This is understandable, as under the pre-Franks
"four-comers" approach, followed in many jurisdictions, a challenge to the
probable cause finding in a search warrant case was confined to the four
comers of the affidavit itself, meaning that no evidentiary hearing was
required. On the other hand, if impeachment of the affidavit is permitted,
this can result in a lengthy, time-consuming evidentiary hearing. 59 Holding,
as Franks did, that no hearing need be held unless the defendant makes a
preliminary showing of subjective fault in the affiant significantly limits the
number of cases in which such a hearing must be held. Moreover, drawing
the line as the Court did in Franks avoids the difficult question60 of whether
a factual assertion in an affidavit subsequently shown to be false (or,
especially, a true fact not included in the affidavit) was included (or
omitted) innocently or negligently. Beyond this, the Franks Court may
have been influenced by the teaching of United States v. Ventresca that a
''grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will
tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a
56 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703.
57 See, e.g., Theodor v. Superior Court, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972).
58 Franks, 438 U.S. at 168.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (noting that the
hearing in which challenge of the truth of the affidavit was made took twelve days).
60 See United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[N]o workable
test suggests itself for determining whether an officer was negligent or completely innocent
in not checking his facts further.").
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judicial office before acting., 61 In any event, it is clear that none of these
considerations are at play in Herring. Indeed, the Herring rule cuts in
exactly the opposite direction by intruding a new and often difficult issue
62into many suppression hearings, as the Herring dissenters properly noted.
IV. THE "NEGLIGENCE" EXCEPTION
There are good reasons to be highly critical of the majority opinion in
the Herring case. One reason is that, as explained above, much of what the
majority has to say in support of its result has a bogus quality to it. But
another reason, perhaps even more compelling, concerns what is missing
from that opinion. Since the Court's holding rests upon the conclusion that
Fourth Amendment violations of the negligence variety (or, as discussed
below, at least some of them) are different from more culpable violations
because the "benefits of deterrence" are significantly lower in such
circumstances, one would think that somewhere in the Herring opinion
there would appear a direct statement as to precisely why this is so. But no
such statement by the Herring majority is to be found. This is a shocking
omission, but is in a sense understandable, as it is far from apparent that any
halfway plausible case for that proposition can be made.
The first argument that comes to mind in that regard is that the
"benefits of deterrence" are low in negligence cases because negligent acts
are not subject to meaningful deterrence. While this point is certainly
implied in the opinion of the Chief Justice, nothing is offered by way of
establishing that this is so. It would seem that it is not so, for, as pointed
out by the four Herring dissenters, such a
suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law-that liability for
negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater care. The
Government so acknowledges.
That the mistake here involved the failure to make a computer entry hardly means
that application of the exclusionary rule would have minimal value. "Just as the risk
of respondeat superior liability encourages employers to supervise ... their
employees' conduct [more carefully], so the risk of exclusion encourages
policymakers and systems managers to monitor the performance of the systems they
install and the personnel employed to operate those systems."
63
61 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
62 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 710 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[The
majority] has imposed a considerable administrative burden on courts and law
enforcement.").
63 Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 29 n.5 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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Remarkably, the majority's only response to this point is a footnote
objection that they "do not suggest" exclusion in such cases "could have no
deterrent effect"6--apparently a backhanded way of saying that in
negligence cases there is significantly less deterrent effect, although once
again nothing at all is offered to support that conclusion. Nor is it apparent
what might have been offered. If the "benefits of deterrence" would have
been sufficiently weighty if the bad recordkeeping had been attributable to
intentional or reckless conduct of an employee of the sheriffs office-
presumably because the suppression would have prompted the sheriff to
take appropriate corrective measures-why is it less likely the sheriff would
so act in response to the suppression where an employee's negligence
brought about equally serious consequences?
In addition, because the consequences are equally serious whatever the
degree of culpability of the sheriff's employee, it is apparent that no
distinction can be drawn in terms of just what results need to be deterred.
For five months Herring was at risk of being arrested on a withdrawn
warrant, a risk that ended only after he was in fact arrested (apparently the
only event likely to have corrected the records error and thus to have ended
the risk for the future),65 but this was so whether the records error was
attributable to intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct. Nor can it
plausibly be argued that negligent violations of the Fourth Amendment, as a
class, are not sufficiently harmful to be an appropriate subject of the
exclusionary doctrine. As any habitual reader of Fourth Amendment
appellate opinions can attest, many more violations of the Fourth
Amendment are the result of carelessness than are attributable to deliberate
misconduct. Application of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court
instructs, demonstrates "that our society attaches serious consequences to
violations of constitutional rights,, 66 and provides "an incentive to err on
the side of constitutional behavior. 67 There is nothing about the volume or
nature of negligent violations of the Fourth Amendment that makes such
demonstration unnecessary, and providing an incentive to do things right is
no less important when the wrongdoing was simply failing to pay attention.
Perhaps the unstated assumption is that deterrence by way of the
exclusionary rule is not needed with respect to negligent violations of the
Fourth Amendment (or some species of them) because a sufficient level of
deterrence is provided by some other force. As the Herring dissenters note,
at oral argument it was asserted "that police departments have become
6 Id. at 702 n.4.
65 As the Herring dissenters note, the "record reflects no routine practice of checking the
database for accuracy." Id. at 708.
66 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
67 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
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sufficiently 'professional' that they do not need external deterrence to avoid
Fourth Amendment violations., 68 But it is less than apparent how it is that
this presumed professionalism would have such a profound effect uniquely
upon negligent conduct. Indeed, the above assertion is not so limited; nor is
its obvious source, a like statement made in the opinion of the Court in
Hudson v. Michigan.69 But Hudson cites no body of professional opinion
supporting that particular "take" on deterrence via professionalism versus
the exclusionary rule. A citation to the work of one respected criminologist
is cited, but he has publicly repudiated such reliance on his work, noting
that its import was "misrepresented" by the Court and that his view was that
"[b]etter police work... was a consequence of the exclusionary rule rather
than a reason to do away with it."70 That very point is made by the Herring
dissenters' pithy rebuke that "professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary
rule's efficacy-not of its superfluity."'"
V. THE ATTENUATION REQUIREMENT
While the negligent character of the actor's conduct appears to be the
principal feature of the category excluded by Herring, the line the Court
draws is actually narrower than this, as the Court's holding only covers
such negligence as is "attenuated" 72 from the subsequent search or
seizure-in Herring itself the defendant's arrest on the nonexistent warrant.
This means that the analysis up to this point is in a sense incomplete, as any
critique of Herring must take into account this "attenuated" qualifier. It is
well to note, however, that Herring is a "scary" decision in the same sense
that Hudson v. Michigan73 is, in that both cases involve "analysis" that far
outruns the holding. In Hudson, the holding has to do only with a particular
kind of Fourth Amendment violation, unjustified no-knock entries, but
language in the opinion suggests that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule has more generally become obsolete. In Herring, the holding is limited
only to that negligence that is "attenuated," but the reasoning seems
directed at an across-the-board embrace of Judge Friendly's thesis, under
which only "flagrant or deliberate" violations of the Fourth Amendment
count when it comes to the exclusionary rule. That is, both Hudson and
Herring seem to set the table for a more ominous holding on some future
occasion. In a sense, Herring is scarier than Hudson because it is easier to
68 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 n.6.
69 547 U.S. 586, 597-98 (2006).
70 Liptak, supra note 14.
71 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 n.6.
72 Id. at 698.
7' 547 U.S. 586.
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anticipate the Court taking a bigger bite out of the exclusionary rule than
abandoning it entirely. It is thus understandable that some have responded
to the Herring decision with alarm, predicting that the "attenuated" qualifier
in that case will soon evaporate.74  As the preceding discussion
demonstrates, there does not exist a legitimate basis for excising all
negligence cases from the exclusionary rule.
With that out of the way, it is possible to return to the Herring holding
itself and ask (i) just how broad the holding in the case actually is,
considering the "attenuated" qualifier; and (ii) whether there is something
about this status of attenuation that actually lessens the "deterrent effect" of
evidence exclusion, so that it would be legitimate to remove all such cases
from the reach of the exclusionary rule. Such inquiry, it would seem, must
begin by asking exactly what the word "attenuated" means as used in
Herring. The word pops up only one other time in the Herring majority
opinion, but neither there nor earlier is any effort made to describe the sense
in which the word is being employed. (That this is so would seem to
reinforce the speculation that the Chief Justice's opinion was originally
drafted to free all forms of negligence from the exclusionary rule, and that
the "attenuated" qualification became a necessary add-on to garner the
needed fifth vote.7 5)
While something is attenuated when it becomes diluted, lessened, or
weakened, it is far from clear in what sense that is true as applied to the
facts of Herring, especially since the negligent bookkeeping carried as
much force on the date the defendant was arrested as it did when it was
performed. The word "attenuated" in Herring conceivably refers to any
number of things: (i) that the negligence was by someone other than the
74 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 18 ("But if 'attenuated from the arrest' turns out not to
mean much and not to limit the exception, then courts will refuse exclusion whenever the
defendant fails to prove the police violation was recurring or more than negligent. The effect
here would be to create a strong presumption against exclusion."); Tom Goldstein, The
Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:32 A.M.) ("The one limitation
on the Court's opinion-and it will be the key to determining whether it reworks Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence very significantly-is the Court's statement that its rule applies to
police conduct 'attenuated from the arrest.' Those statements constrain today's holding
largely to the bounds of existing law. But the logic of the decision spans far more broadly,
and the next logical step-which I predict is 2 years away-is abandoning the 'attenuation'
reference altogether.").
75 "The reason for this... is, I strongly suspect, due to the refusal of Justice Anthony
Kennedy to go along with the broad reworking of the exclusionary rule desired by the other
four justices in the majority of this 5-4 decision." Craig Bradley, Red Herring or the Death
of the Exclusionary Rule?, 45 TRIAL 52, 53 (Apr. 2009).
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officer who made the arrest; 7 6 (ii) that the negligence was an omission
rather than an act; 77 (iii) that the negligence occurred five months prior to
the arrest; 78 (iv) that the negligence was by a person in a different
jurisdiction than the locale of arrest or prosecution, who for that reason is
not as amenable to deterrence; 79 (v) that the negligence had to do with the
maintenance of police records, a subset of police activity not prone to error
or in need of deterrence; 80 or (vi) that while the negligence was by a law
enforcement employee, that employee, by virtue of his or her assignment, is
less in need of deterrence than the typical policeman. 8' As to each of these
alternatives, it must be asked (a) how likely it is that this interpretation is
the Herring majority's perception of the qualifier "attenuated," and (b)
whether it can be said that such a perception of "attenuated" actually
describes a class of conduct as to which the critical consequence of reduced
"benefits of deterrence" actually exists.
Under an option (i) interpretation of Herring, all "second-hand" Fourth
Amendment negligence, that is, negligence committed by someone other
than the arresting or searching officer and not known by that officer, would
no longer be subject to the exclusionary rule. There is some suggestion in
Herring that this is what the majority is thinking, especially in their attempt
to match the instant case up with Leon. It is claimed that since that case
does not require suppression of "evidence obtained in objectively
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant," then the
"same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently recalled warrant., 82  By thus equating reliance on a
76 As pointed out by the Herring majority, this proposition was emphasized by the court
of appeals, which noted that the arresting officers "were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing
or carelessness." Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699 (quoting United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d
1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007)).
77 The Herring majority observed that the lower court characterized the clerk's conduct
as "a negligent failure to act." Id. (quoting Herring, 492 F.3d at 1218).
78 It has been suggested that the "attenuated" language in Herring "appears to refer to the
fact that the clerical error was made five months before the arrest." McAdams, supra note
18.
79 It has been said of Herring that "it is unclear whether the fact that these were police
from a different county is significant or not." Bradley, supra note 75, at 53.
80 Richard McAdams speculates that the Court might later "distinguish errors that do not
involve record-keeping." McAdams, supra note 18.
81 Such an interpretation would be consistent with Orin Kerr's conclusion that Herring
"is a minor case," Orin Kerr, Responding to Tom Goldstein on Herring, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/1231961926.shtml (Jan. 14, 2009, 2:38 P.M.), one that
is "almost a replay" of Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Posting of Orin Kerr, Supreme
Court Hands Down Herring v. United States, LEx REx, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
LexRex/message/1885 (Jan. 14, 2009, 7:02 P.M.).
82 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703.
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warrant later invalidated with reliance on a warrant that does not even exist,
the Herring Court seems to be saying that the matter must be viewed solely
from the perspective of the arresting or searching officer, so that if the
officer, as an individual, is not at fault then the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable. Yet there also exists in the Herring majority opinion other
language reflecting that those Justices fully appreciate that such a broad
view of the "attenuated" concept cannot be squared with the Court's prior
holdings on the scope of the exclusionary rule. Quoting important language
from the very same Leon case,83 the Court quite correctly asserts that in
"analyzing the applicability of the rule ... we must consider the action of
all the police officers involved.,8 4 The word all obviously includes those
members of law enforcement who communicate information to others who
then are prompted to act by making a seizure or search.
But one is not totally reassured by the inclusion of this latter language
in Herring, given comments by some of the same Justices in Arizona v.
Evans85 regarding Whiteley v. Warden.86  Whiteley held that where an
officer makes an arrest on reasonable reliance upon a radio bulletin, the
Fourth Amendment still requires suppression of the evidence obtained
thereby if that bulletin was not in fact grounded in probable cause. But
Whiteley was summarily dismissed in Evans on the basis that it was
grounded in the now-rejected approach under which "the Court treated
identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to that
violation. 87  Whiteley is an exceedingly important Fourth Amendment
decision, for without it an officer lacking grounds to search or seize could
avoid any risk of suppression by merely passing the job on to another
officer. Especially in light of the frequency with which police are prompted
to make seizures and searches based upon communications with other
police,88 it would be unconscionable if Whiteley were, in effect, largely
nullified by construing all Whiteley situations as fitting within Herring's
attenuation principle. If that is what Herring contemplates, then the day has
83 "It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who
eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who
provided information material to the probable-cause determination." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24 (1984).
84 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
85 514 U.S. at 13.
86 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
87 Evans, 514 U.S. at 13.
88 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 3.5.
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arrived when the Fourth Amendment is truly nothing more than "a form of
words."
89
Precisely because the interpretation of "attenuated" in option (i) would
cut such a wide swath through the exclusionary rule, any of the other five
possibilities may seem relatively benign by comparison. However, each of
the other interpretations has its own difficulties. Option (ii) seems the least
likely, for no plausible reason is apparent as to why the "deterrent effect" of
the exclusionary rule could be said to be different depending upon whether
the Fourth Amendment violation was of the omission rather than
commission variety. That is, if the bookkeeping error had been the result of
a mistaken and negligent entry of defendant's name instead of the person
for whom a warrant had issued, it is difficult to see why that situation
should be treated any differently than the actual facts of Herring.
As for option (iii), as noted earlier, it is of course true that in another
branch of exclusionary rule jurisprudence, that having to do with the "fruit
of the poisonous tree," a temporal span between the "tree," that is the
occasion of the underlying Fourth Amendment violation, and the "fruit,"
the evidence the defendant now seeks to suppress, is of some relevance.
But the fact that time is a relevant consideration in working out the matter
of causation hardly suggests that it is likewise relevant to the issue
presented by Herring. If one were to assume a case like Herring except
that the failure to strike the withdrawn warrant had occurred five days
earlier instead of five months earlier, this would hardly seem to make any
difference, since in both instances the erroneous record was in place at the
time it was consulted, and thus in a quite direct way caused an arrest of the
defendant despite the absence of any actual basis for it. In short, whatever
one's view of the concept of "deterrent effect," it is difficult to see how that
effect would somehow diminish with the passage of time.90
Consider then option (iv), the notion that attenuation existed in
Herring because the mistake occurred in a different county than the
resulting arrest or prosecution. The Herring majority did not specifically
embrace such a reading of its "attenuated" qualifier, but it is noteworthy
that the Court at one point did emphasize that "somebody in Dale County"
was responsible for the error in the records there and that the "Coffee
County officers did nothing improper."9' Moreover, in affirming the
decision of the court of appeals, the majority noted that the lower court's
89 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
90 Indeed, there is a sense in which the passage of time makes the circumstances more
egregious and thus more in need of deterrence. As noted in another case with facts similar to
those in Herring, the defendant "was a 'marked man' for the five months prior to his arrest."
United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D. Nev. 1975).
91 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
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decision was grounded in a finding that the negligence in the instant case
was in fact "attenuated." 92 Thus, it is worth noting here an important aspect
of the court of appeals' analysis. That court stated:
There is also the unique circumstance here that the exclusionary sanction would be
levied not in a case brought by officers of the department that was guilty of the
negligent record keeping, but instead it would scuttle a case brought by officers of a
different department in another county, one whose officers and personnel were
entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness. We do not mean to suggest that
Dale County law enforcement agencies are not interested in the successful prosecution
of crime throughout the state, but their primary responsibility and interest lies in their
own cases. Hoping to gain a beneficial deterrent effect on Dale County personnel by
excluding evidence in a case brought by Coffee County officers would be like telling
a student that if he skips school one of his classmates will be punished. The student
may not exactly relish the prospect of causing another to suffer, but human nature
being what it is, he is unlikely to fear that prospect as much as he would his own
suffering. For all of these reasons, we are convinced that this is one of those
situations where "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by
extending the rule... is uncertain at best," where the benefits of suppression would
be "marginal or nonexistent," and where the exclusionary rule would not "pay its way
by deterring official lawlessness."
93
This notion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule stops at the
county line is an odd one indeed, especially when it is recognized that the
argument set out in the above quotation does not simply have to do with the
fact that the arrest was made by an officer in another county, but that also
the case was "brought" in the neighboring county, 94 so that application of
the exclusionary rule would "scuttle a case" brought other than in the
county where the record error occurred. But the notion that the deterrence
effect of the exclusionary rule is significantly diminished when the much-
trumpeted "cost" (loss of a conviction that doubtless would not have been
obtained anyway had the Fourth Amendment been complied with) occurs in
another jurisdiction, so that consequently the rule should not apply in such
circumstances, runs contrary to longstanding and well-accepted Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The fact that the exclusionary rule is applicable even
when the jurisdiction of the offending individual and the jurisdiction that
would lose the fruits via suppression are different was settled even before
Mapp v. Ohio,95 when the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States
abolished the "silver platter" doctrine.96
92 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
93 United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
94 Id. The court of appeals was not strictly correct in this respect, of course, as the case
was "brought," in the sense of being prosecuted, in federal court for violations of federal
law.
9' 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
96 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Ever since Elkins, it has been clear that evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed (1) when the error was by
state officers and the evidence is offered in a federal prosecution,97 (2) when
the error was by federal officers and the evidence is offered in a state
prosecution,98 (3) when the error was by officers in one state and the
evidence is offered in a prosecution in another state,99 and, most certainly,
(4) when the error was by officers in one county and the evidence is offered
in a prosecution in another county of that state.'00 Although Elkins pre-
dates Mapp, it is directly relevant to the matter at issue here, for the Court
in that case grounded its decision in the proposition that the exclusionary
rule's "purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it. '"101 Such purpose was served in the instant case, the Court
reasoned, in light of the extent of "federal-state cooperation in criminal
investigation."' 2 Considering that the most common form of cooperation
between jurisdictions is that involving the exchange of information, such as
about outstanding warrants, the firmly established Elkins doctrine stands as
a most effective rebuttal of the argument made by the court of appeals in
Herring.
Of course, in the typical Elkins situation the search was conducted by
an officer in one jurisdiction and the fruits are being offered in another
jurisdiction, while Herring is a bit more complex in that the police error
producing the constitutional violation occurred in one county, the illegal-
arrest consequence was then innocently brought about by an officer of
another county, and then finally the fruits were tendered in a federal
prosecution. But, if under Elkins the jurisdiction-of-prosecution difference
is of no significance, it is hard to see how it is that the jurisdiction-of-arrest
difference should matter. The contrary has sometimes been asserted; for
example, in Hoay v. State, a case quite similar to Herring, the dissenting
justices argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply where "the
arresting officer from one county relied in good faith upon the information
from another county."'0 3 But their explanation for this conclusion was that
97 See, e.g., United States v. Self, 410 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1969); Sablowski v. United
States, 403 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1968).
98 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965); State v.
Harms, 449 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1989).
99 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Krogness v. Gladden, 242 F. Supp. 499 (D. Or. 1965);
State v. Krogness, 388 P.2d 120 (Or. 1963).
100 See, e.g., Hoay v. State, 71 S.W.3d 573 (Ark. 2002).
101 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
102 Id. at 222.
103 Hoay, 71 S.W.3d at 578.
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"there was nothing more the arresting officer could have done except ignore
the outstanding warrant, and that would have been a clear dereliction of his
duty." '0 4 Quite obviously, that reasoning gives no support to a county-line
limitation on the exclusionary rule, for had the officer making the arrest in
Herring been an officer in the department where the error was made, he
would have been in precisely the same predicament. And because the
arresting officer himself was in no sense at fault, so that neither the officer
personally nor his employing jurisdiction could be held liable to pay
damages, 0 5 there is no reason to believe that if the arrest in Herring had
been by a same-county officer, then that officer's actions would have had a
more profound impact upon that sheriff's department in a deterrence sense.
In short, since it was the negligent maintenance of the records rather
than the conduct of the arresting and searching officer that produced the
Fourth Amendment violation in Herring, the location of the arresting
officer should make no difference. As the Hoay majority explained, if the
"fault" was solely in the police records of another county, it would still "fly
in the face of the Leon principle" not to suppress, for Leon "makes clear"
that "the touchstone of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police
misconduct."10 6 Indeed, in one sense arrests based on bogus records in
another jurisdiction are more serious; in Herring, for example, it meant that
the defendant was at risk of being illegally arrested on the false Dale
County records even when he was outside that county. 107
What then of option (v), under which the requisite attenuation is
deemed to occur only through a process of a mistaken entry into a law
enforcement recordkeeping system and the subsequent extraction and
reliance upon that misinformation to justify an arrest or search? That this is
what the Herring majority meant by the "attenuated" limitation on its
holding is not apparent, but there is, at least, a suggestion that this is so
because of the majority's reliance upon Arizona v. Evans,'08 another
erroneous-records case (albeit involving judicial records), leading to the
declaration that the error in the instant case was of a lesser magnitude than
104 Id. at 578.
105 In such a case the "arresting officer would be sheltered by qualified immunity, and
the police department itself is not liable for the negligent acts of its employees." Herring v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 709 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
106 Hoay, 71 S.W.3d at 577 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
107 Although this was apparently not the case in Herring itself, in a great many instances
the erroneous police record will haunt the defendant wherever he goes. See, e.g., United
States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D. Nev. 1975) (noting that once misinformation
was introduced into the NCIC computer, defendant could have been falsely arrested
"anywhere in the United States where law enforcement officers had access to NCIC
information").
108 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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in Evans because such errors in the Evans warrant records were slightly less
rare.109 But even if it thus might be concluded that Herring involves "only
a slight change from Arizona v. Evans,"" this hardly means that the
Herring case, so construed, can simply be dismissed because of its benign
character, for (as discussed further below) in the broad view of things, the
problem of Fourth Amendment violations resulting from bad recordkeeping
can hardly be dismissed as insignificant.
Assuming that the "attenuated" limitation in Herring is directed
specifically at bookkeeping errors in police records, it is once again
necessary to ask the question raised earlier as to other aspects and other
possible readings of that case: exactly what is there about this particular
variety of Fourth Amendment violations that produces the necessary
reduced "benefits of deterrence"? While not even a clue is to be found in
the Herring majority opinion, it might be thought that the answer lies in
making a calculation similar to that in Hudson v. Michigan,11" ' purportedly
showing that the particular kind of violation there at issue (noncompliance
with the knock-and-announce requirement) was not in need of more
deterrence via the exclusionary rule. The contention in Hudson was that
"the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin with" ' because the
only thing to be gained by unannounced entry is "prevention of destruction
of evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of
the premises,"'1 3 the very risks that make the knock-and-announce
procedures inapplicable in particular cases.
Actually, the Government in Herring did make a no-more-deterrence-
needed type of argument; as noted by the dissenters, the Government
contended "that police forces already possess sufficient incentives to
maintain up-to-date records," as "the police have no desire to send officers
out on arrests unnecessarily, because arrests consume resources and place
officers in danger."' 1 4 But the facts of Herring belie that assertion. As the
four dissenters aptly note: "The facts of this case do not fit that description
of police motivation. Here the officer wanted to arrest Herring and
consulted the Department's records to legitimate his predisposition."" 15 Nor
109 The Herring Court noted that, in the instant case, the record clerks' testimony that
they could "remember no similar miscommunication ever happening on their watch" was
touted as "even less error" than in Evans, where the testimony was as to a similar error
"every three or four years." Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 15).
110 Bradley, supra note 75, at 53.
... 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
112 Id. at 595.
113 Id. at 599.
114 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115 Id.
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is there any reason to believe that this aspect of Herring is out of the
ordinary. During the course of Terry stops on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, it is very common for the officer to obtain the suspect's
identity and then run a warrant check. 16 And during a traffic stop, even for
the most petty of infractions, it has become part of the "routine" to run a
warrant check not only on the driver, but also on all the passengers."
17
Given the pervasiveness and utility of the warrant check in current practice,
certainly a higher level of illegal arrests because of clerical errors is likely
to appear advantageous rather than disadvantageous if there is no risk that
windfall evidence acquired by arrest on a nonexistent warrant will be
suppressed. This is especially the case since the nature of the illegality is
such that the arresting officers in these instances cannot be faulted for
having made the arrests. Indeed, after Herring, police are unlikely to be
troubled by the fact that these windfalls are being gained only at the cost of
violating the constitutional rights of citizens; as Terry v. Ohio teaches,
"admitting evidence in a criminal trial ... has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence.""18
A somewhat different claim of the requisite reduced "benefits of
deterrence" might be grounded in the supposed infrequency of errors in
police records. That the Herring Court may have been thinking along these
lines is suggested by the fact that the majority emphasized that witnesses in
the sheriffs department involved in that case "testified that they could
remember no similar miscommunication ever happening on their watch."' 19
Thus, the thinking might be that since such a mistake had never been made
before, it was unlikely ever to occur again, meaning suppression in the
interest of prompting closer supervision of that records system would
hardly be necessary. But viewing the problem nationwide and not merely
as to the record system at issue in Herring, there is every reason to believe
that illegal arrests attributable to record error pose no small problem. For
one thing, through a process of data aggregation and data mining, greatly
facilitated by modem technology, law enforcement agencies now have
available a volume of information in their records far exceeding that
maintained in the past. 120 This data is not limited simply to such matters as
outstanding warrants, but includes a broad range of information that could
116 See, e.g., People v. H.J., 931 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1997); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215
(Wyo. 1994).
117 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. 2008); State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796
(N.J. 2008).
118 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
"9 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
120 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1403-08 (2001).
2009]
WAYNE R. LAFA VE
be accepted as factually accurate and then used as total or partial
justification of a seizure or search. Also, computers have facilitated
information sharing, so that much of this data is now available to other law
enforcement agencies. 121 In short, as the four Herring dissenters put it:
"Electronic databases form the nervous system of contemporary criminal
justice operations." 22
There is no basis for concluding that the amount of error in this vast
array of data is at some tolerable or irreducible minimum. Government
reports indicate "that law enforcement databases are insufficiently
monitored and often out of date." 123 And the appellate cases 124 make it
apparent that illegal arrests and searches attributable to error in police
records is no small problem. (Those cases, of course, reflect only a part of
the problem, considering "that there are many unlawful searches ... of
innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating ... about which courts
do nothing, and about which we never hear. 1 25) Moreover, as mentioned
earlier, bad recordkeeping such as that in Herring, representing that there is
an outstanding arrest warrant on a person when there is not, has a ticking
time bomb character to it, and in that sense is a more serious matter than
many other sorts of Fourth Amendment violations. When at a particular
time and place a particular police officer unreasonably interprets the
observed circumstances and makes an arrest that ought not have been made,
this is bad enough, but at least it is a single event with rather narrow time-
place-occasion dimensions. But a mistake of the kind at issue in Herring is
quite a different matter; "computerization greatly amplifies an error's
effect," as "inaccurate data can infect not only one agency, but the many
agencies that share access to the database."' 126 Such errors can result in the
object of the erroneous information being arrested repeatedly,12 7 and make
12 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("States are actively expanding
information sharing between jurisdictions. As a result, law enforcement has an increasing
supply of information within its easy electronic reach.").
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing several government reports).
124 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 3.5(d).
125 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
126 As stated in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1995)
(noting, for example, that NCIC records are available to about 71,000 federal, state, and
local agencies, so that "any mistake entered into the NCIC spreads nationwide in an
instant").
127 See, e.g., Finch v. Chapman, 785 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. 111. 1992) (referring to
misinformation long retained in NCIC records that resulted in plaintiff being arrested and
detained twice); Rogan v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining that
as a result of misinformation in computer records, plaintiff was arrested four times, three of
which were at gunpoint).
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that individual a "marked man" su'bject to illegal arrest "anywhere," "at any
time," and "into the indefinite future."
12 8
Finally, there is option (vi) regarding the possible interpretation of the
word "attenuated" as used in Herring, one that finds the requisite reduced
"benefits of deterrence" in the nature of the job held by the individual
whose negligent act led to the illegal arrest. Under this view of Herring, it
could be said that the Court has merely taken the reasoning in Arizona v.
Evans'29 and extended it to what was believed to be a very closely
analogous situation, where again the error is not attributable to a "front
line" or "on the street" police officer, but rather someone performing
clerical tasks. Evans is a case much like Herring, except that the mistake
was attributable to a clerk who worked in the judicial branch. In holding
the exclusionary rule inapplicable in those circumstances, the Court relied
largely upon the proposition that there was no basis for concluding that
"court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment."' 130 The implication is that these court employees (who, the
Evans Court reminds us, are not "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime"'131) are hardly motivated to undertake
calculated intrusions upon Fourth Amendment interests, and consequently
are unworthy objects of the exclusionary rule and its deterrence function.
Thus, it might be concluded that the "attenuated" test is met in Herring
precisely because that is an apt description of clerks generally, without
regard to whether they are located in the courthouse or the police station.
Whether this is the unstated view of attenuation in Herring is not clear,
although the possibility that this is the case is suggested by the majority's
disclaimer that Evans "was entirely 'premised on a distinction between
judicial errors and police errors,'"'' 32 as well as the majority's game of
"gotcha" with the dissenters-dismissing Justice Breyer's reliance on a
judicial errors versus police errors distinction by noting that in Evans
Justice Ginsburg had characterized such a distinction as "artificial. ' 33
Perhaps the reason the Herring majority said no more along these lines was
because it was not possible on the record in that case to determine the
precise status of the person whose negligence left the warrant notice
outstanding in the sheriff's department's records. But, while the court
below merely "assume[d] ... that the negligent actor, who is unidentified in
128 United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D. Nev. 1975).
129 Evans, 514 U.S. 1.
130 Id. at 14-15.
I ld. at 16.
132 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 n.3 (2009).
133 Id. at 701 n.3 (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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the record, is an adjunct to law enforcement," '134 it appears likely that the
offender was either a person holding the position of "warrant clerk" or
someone under her supervision.135  In support of Herring, therefore, it
might be asserted that a warrant clerk in the sheriffs department needs no
more deterrence than the warrant clerk over in the courthouse.
With Evans on the books, this interpretation of the Herring
"attenuated" requirement certainly has more appeal than any of the others
previously considered. For one thing, such an interpretation would ensure
that Herring is limited in the same fashion as Evans, so that if there is a
mistake in a police record, computer or otherwise, but the mistake was not
that of the record keepers, but of detectives and other police officials who
supplied information for the records, the defendant would prevail.1 36 There
is still reason to be concerned about Herring, however, even if it is
ameliorated by such a limited reading. Given that the Herring exception to
the exclusionary rule covers only instances of "isolated negligence
attenuated from the arrest,"'137 there is something odd about the conclusion
that only some negligence is being exempted, namely that by clerical
personnel, and that the reason is because such persons are not motivated to
engage in deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment. As noted earlier,
the central concern is with negligently maintained records, which is a
current problem of considerable magnitude, and consequently the criticisms
stated earlier with respect to the option (v) interpretation of "attenuated"
would appear to be largely applicable to option (vi) as well.
Moreover, in terms of minimizing the risk of erroneous records leading
to arrests and searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that Evans exempts the errors of judicial
clerks that the same result should obtain as to police clerks. When the clerk
is also a member of the police department, whether civilian employee or
uniformed officer, the police agency is in a better position to remedy the
situation and might well do so if the exclusionary rule were there to remove
the incentive to do otherwise. Finally, this option (vi) reading of Herring
has less going for it than the view of the dissenters in that case for yet
another reason: the Evans distinction between police errors and non-police
134 United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1217 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
135 The Court in Herring says that this is the person who "[n]ormally ... enters the
information in the sheriffs computer database" when a warrant is recalled. 129 S. Ct. at
698.
136 People v. Willis, 46 P.3d 898, 906 (Cal. 2002) (noting that the state can prevail only if
error in parole list was by "a data entry clerk," "the person who prepared it, rather than by a
parole officer who failed to update defendant's file or forward the information to the
appropriate person").
131 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
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errors presents a clear line; but once it is concluded that police employees
must be sorted out on the basis of their assignment, the temptation will be to
extend the exemption to others, such as dispatchers, whose conduct has
traditionally and rightly been viewed as within the exclusionary rule's
purview.
1 8
VI. THE TASK FOR THE LOWER COURTS
While the foregoing discussion of Herring would indicate that the
decision is more to be regretted than praised, it is now a part of our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and hence it is necessary to consider how trial
and appellate courts should go about interpreting and applying the case
whenever presented with a fact situation not on all fours with Herring.
That will sometimes be a daunting task, given the fact that Herring requires
what two of the dissenters aptly referred to as a "multifactored inquiry" 139-
yet another reason to have doubts about the wisdom of Herring. For one
thing, courts will need to determine what variety of Fourth Amendment
violation, in the culpability sense, will bring the case within the Herring
exception, and then will have to determine whether that is the degree of
culpability existing in the instant case. Quite clearly, intentional and
reckless wrongdoing will not qualify, 40 but negligence will, at least
sometimes. It is important to note that the first branch of the
"circumstances" incorporated into Herring's "We hold" sentence is stated
not merely as any negligence, but rather as "isolated negligence,"
14 1
referred to elsewhere in the opinion as "nonrecurring" 14' negligence and
later distinguished from "routine or widespread"'' 43 negligence. This
strongly suggests that in a case somewhat like Herring, in which the record
failed to show 144 that such mistakes were occurring in the use of this
138 See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
the "exclusionary rule applies when an error by a dispatcher or an officer leads to a Fourth
Amendment violation"); State v. Trenidad, 595 P.2d 957 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (applying
the exclusionary rule where dispatcher falsely asserted that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant for defendant, notwithstanding good faith of arresting officer).
139 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 711.
140 The Court in Herring stated: "If the police have been shown to be reckless in
maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the
groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases
should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation." Id. at 703.
141 Id. at 698.
142 Id. at 702.
141 Id. at 704.
144 The proposition is put this way because, as discussed later herein, the burden of proof
of proving facts justifying application of the Herring exception properly is placed upon the
prosecution. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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particular records system only rarely, then the Herring exception to the
exclusionary rule would not apply.
Later on, the Court seems to identify two other varieties of negligence
that are probably not encompassed within the Herring exception, for the
majority declares that the "exclusionary rule serves to deter ... grossly
,,141
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances ... systemic negligence.
The Court offers no definition or illustration of either of these two
categories. As for the term "gross negligence," it is, as the Supreme Court
has itself observed, one of those "elusive terms" that has "left the finest
scholars puzzled,"' 146 and hence it can fairly be said that the term's use in
Herring is itself somewhat puzzling. On yet another occasion the Court
observed that "the term is a 'nebulous' one, in practice typically meaning
little different from recklessness."' 147  But since the "grossly negligent
conduct" term is used in Herring to fill out a list into which the term
"reckless" had already been placed, presumably the term is not being used
merely as a synonym for recklessness. This suggests that perhaps the
reference is to that version of gross negligence involving only objective
fault, but with a greater departure from the reasonable man standard, 148 in
which case an otherwise "isolated" instance of negligence would not qualify
for the Herring treatment if it involved such a greater deviation.
As for "systemic negligence," a term never before used by the
Supreme Court, 149 it presumably refers to a variety of negligence that has an
effect upon an entire recordkeeping system. Such is the case, it has been
noted, in "an environment in which negligent management and oversight
created conditions" permitting the specific error to occur. 150 Thus, it would
seem that if a false entry in law enforcement records or failure to discover
the same is fairly attributable to a lack of sufficient management or
oversight, then the case would not fall within the Herring exception. The
same would appear to be true if either the making of the error or the failure
to detect it is related to some other "systemic" problem, such as the manner
in which the recordkeeping system at issue has been structured. But just
what is necessary to show what the Court referred to as "systemic error"
151
145 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
146 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1985).
147 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1970).
148 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(b) (2d ed. 2003).
149 But the term "systemic deterrent" is sometimes used in discussion of the exclusionary
rule, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984), and it may be what is lost if there
is no suppression in the case of "systemic negligence."
150 DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE & SARAH GREEN, CHILD ABUSE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST PUBLIC
BODIES: A COMPARATIVE LAW VIEW 165 (2004).
151 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009).
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at another point in Herring is far from clear. Certainly, the reoccurrence of
the same kind of error for some time without any effective response would
seem highly relevant, and perhaps the length of time that a specific error
remained uncorrected is also significant' 52-although Herring indicates that
this length of time must exceed five months!
But while the first task of a lower court in applying the Herring case is
to distinguish so-called "isolated" negligence from all other forms of
culpability (intent, recklessness, and negligence of a gross or systemic
nature), that is the beginning but by no means the end of that court's
responsibility. While it is true that a fair amount of the discussion in
Herring has to do only with that distinction, the holding in the case requires
that in addition the requisite form of negligence can also be said to be
"attenuated," in the sense of manifesting a situation where the "benefits of
deterrence" are less than would otherwise be the case. Especially since, as
noted earlier, the "attenuated" qualification in the Court's holding appears
to have been added in order to garner the requisite five votes, it would be a
serious mistake for a lower court to pretend that the "attenuated" element of
Herring did not exist or to interpret that element so broadly as to render the
exclusionary rule largely inoperable.
While surely Herring does not apply when the error regarding police
records occurred at the other end (that is, at the time when those records
were negligently consulted by the arresting or searching officer), 5 3 the
mere fact that this officer was not personally at fault in relying upon the
information supplied to him by other police sources is not alone a basis for
finding that the "attenuated" requirement of Herring has been satisfied. As
noted earlier, such a ham-handed application of Herring is totally without
justification, and would have the unfortunate result of withdrawing the
protections of the Fourth Amendment from all cases governed by the
principle of Whiteley v. Warden,' 54 namely, that a good faith arrest by an
152 As stated by the three concurring Justices in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995):
Surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a recordkeeping system, their
own or some other agency's, that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that
routinely leads to false arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased
to exist (if it ever existed).
(emphasis omitted).
153 Cf Phelan v. Village of Lyons, 531 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that "there
was no probable cause" where officer ran routine license plate check on Cadillac with plate
number 1020 and computer reported back that vehicle with that plate was stolen, but officer
failed to read the next line on the screen indicating that vehicle was a motorcycle, which was
significant because the same numbers were used for car and cycle licenses, but plates for the
latter were smaller).
154 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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officer relying upon a police source is still a constitutional violation if the
requisite grounds for that arrest did not exist at the source.
This is not to suggest that lower courts should deem the "attenuated"
requisite to be unmet except upon a case factually on all fours with Herring.
As explained earlier, it does not seem that the attenuation in Herring itself
is attributable to either the fact that the negligence was of the omission
variety, the fact that it occurred five months prior to the defendant's arrest,
or the fact that it occurred in a different county. On the other hand, what
was characterized earlier as options (v) and (vi) to interpreting Herring,
finding attenuation, respectively, in the fact that a mistake in police records
was involved and that the mistake was made by clerical personnel, would
seem--especially if viewed collectively-to capture what the attenuation
element of Herring is all about. Lower courts are thus well-advised to
apply Herring accordingly.
Yet another factor that lower courts, especially trial courts, will have to
take into account in any future cases in which a Herring claim is made
concerns matters of proof. One important question concerns which party
has the burden of proof on the issue of whether or not there exists
culpability beyond "isolated negligence" and whether such negligence is
"attenuated," which can well depend upon a careful assessment of the facts
in the particular case. As the dissenters in Herring note, the majority's
"focus on deliberate conduct" makes the problems of proof uniquely
difficult, for, as a general proposition, "application of the exclusionary rule
does not require inquiry into the mental state of the police."' 155 Though
nothing is said about this in Herring, it would seem that the burden of proof
must be on the prosecution. As for the generality that the burden of proof is
on the defendant in warrant cases, 156 surely it has no application in a case
like Herring, where it turns out that, in fact, there was no warrant.
Moreover, since Herring, like Evans, purports to be simply an
extension of the "good faith" doctrine, the controlling consideration is that
in the past courts have consistently ruled "that the government has the
burden to prove facts warranting application of the good faith exception.',
157
That conclusion is especially appropriate in Herring-type cases, for in such
instances placing the burden on the prosecution squares with the general
policy of placing the burden on the party who has the greatest access to the
relevant facts. 58 It also squares with the policy of placing the burden on the
"' Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 710 n.7.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1969); State v. Vrtiska, 406
N.W.2d 114 (Neb. 1987).
157 People v. Willis, 46 P.3d 898, 907 (Cal. 2002).
158 See CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337 (4th ed. 1992).
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party seeking an exception to a general rule, 159 which is certainly what a
Herring claim amounts to. Of course, from Herring's quotation of the
Hudson assertion that exclusion "has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse,"'' 60 it might seem that another general policy, that of
handicapping disfavored contentions, 16 1 would support placing the burden
on the defendant.1 62  But even apart from the fact that the Hudson
contention "defies historical truth,"'163 surely, this proposition does not
trump the several others referenced above pointing in the opposite direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Herring is a troubling decision on many counts, and certainly its most
worrisome aspect is that it may be a mere harbinger of things to come-that
the stage has been set for a more broad-ranging assault on the exclusionary
rule whenever five votes can be mustered to drop the other shoe. One can
only wonder whether Weeks and Mapp can survive in any meaningful form
up to their forthcoming centenary and golden anniversary, respectively.
But my principal concern herein has been with Herring on its own terms.
Even if it were the last bite the Court was to take out of the exclusionary
rule, I still could not bring myself to believe that the Herring decision is
other than a complete disaster. The Court's efforts to find underpinnings
for its holding in its prior decisions, by pretending that they support cost-
benefit balancing and a "culpability" distinction in the instant case, are no
less than disingenuous. It is not shown that unconstitutional searches and
seizures brought about by negligence are either less in need of or less
capable of deterrence. And the attenuation qualifier seems only gossamer,
unlikely to survive long, and is totally lacking in meaningful content for
whatever life it may have. Moreover, the case creates new burdens both for
judges conducting suppression hearings and the lower courts charged with
reviewing their decisions. This Herring is, indeed, really surstrmming.
164
We should be served up with something better than this by the Supreme
Court!
159 Id.
160 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.
161 MCCORMICK, supra note 158, § 337.
162 Certainly, if the defendant does have the burden of proof, then, as the Herring
dissenters noted, it would seem, as acknowledged at oral argument, "that a defendant is
entitled to discovery (and if necessary, an audit of police databases)," meaning "the Court
has imposed a considerable administrative burden on courts and law enforcement." Herring,
129 S. Ct. at 710. Of course, discovery can be most important to a defendant in connection
with a suppression hearing even when he does not have the burden of proof. See United
States v. Saledo, 477 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
163 Davies & Scanlon, supra note 16, at 1043.
164 See supra note 7.
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